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Volume 18 No 2
2e trimestre
2002
Second Quarter
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Volume 18 No 1
2e trimestre 2002 Second Quarter

NOUVELLES • NEWS

Remarks by Jeffrey Simpson

Canadians must fight U.S. actions
We gather amidst Lumber IV, the fourth round in a twenty-years battle by certain U.S. lumber producers to restrict Canadian lumber exports to the United States. All in this room know the intricacies of the lumber industry better than I do. My only extremely modest claim is to have watched rounds One through Three, to have written extensively about the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement and to have written a long book two years ago about certain aspects of Canada-American relations.

My comments today are therefore those of an interested observer rather than those of a lumber expert, trade lawyer or government policy-maker.They are also those from someone who has not been hesitant to criticize certain Canadian patterns of behavior vis-à-vis our Americans friends, especially the sense of moral superiority that often infuses Canadian attitudes towards the United States.
They are also those from someone who has not been hesitant to criticize certain Canadian patterns of behavior vis-à-vis our Americans friends, especially the sense of moral superiority that often infuses Canadian attitudes towards the United States. A political market does exist in Canada for preaching this country’s allegedly superior virtues, but while I bow to none in my patriotism, building that patriotism on putting down another country strikes me as hollow and self-defeating, because it blinds us to problems we should otherwise address. I am not therefore a habitual bashers of the United States (…)

(…) Obviously, Lumber IV is being provoked by U.S. lumber producers, although it is significant that major lumber companies with interests in Canada such as Louisiana Pacific and Weyerhauser are sitting on the sidelines. The aggrieved U.S. producers’ game is very simple: to protect as much market share as possible, to push up domestic lumber prices and to increase profits. Theirs tactics are equally transparent: to use U.S. trade law to secure these ends and to line up as much political support as possible. You know the history of Lumber I, Lumber II and Lumber III. The same dynamics were at work then as now.

The Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports has done well thus far in two respects. First, ii got 51 Senators, Democrat and Republican, to sign a letter urging resolution of this dispute on terms favorable to the U.S. or, failing that, to hit Canada hard with the full force of U.S. trade remedy laws. Second – and this is of political importance – it secured support from a variety of environmental groups. This support brought some liberal Democratic Senators on board. It also widened the coalition hectoring Canadian lumber imports. In essence, the environment has now been improbably been conscripted for the U.S. industry’s fight for market share, higher prices and larger profits. To compound matters further, certain extremely gullible Canadian environmental groups, including some in British Columbia, have joined the battle. These environmentalists on both sides of the border should be reminded of a conclusion drawn by a study of the softwood lumber dispute from the U.S. Congressional Research Service, a bipartisan research agency, in February, 2001: “Whether Canadian forests are in better condition than, or are more degraded than, U.S. forests is not clear from existing data.” Case unproven, in other words, by the U.S.’ own admission.In Lumber II and Lumber III, Canada imposed an export tax on itself and consented to a quota restriction with tariffs applied for exports above the quota of 14.7-billion board feet. Both of these came as a direct result of political pressure, trade actions and threats from U.S. interests. Although Canadian rhetoric continues to insist that Canada wants “free trade” in lumber restored with the U.S., this misstates what has actually occurred. Since the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement there has not been “free trade”, but variations of managed trade to which Canada, under duress, has consented.
You can therefore easily understand why U.S. interests do not take seriously Canada’s various victories before NAFTA tribunals, because these have neither validated the Canadian position in U.S. eyes. No sooner did these panels uphold Canada’s position in the mid-1990s than trade actions were again threatened, political allies introduced bills in the U.S. Congress, and Canada reckoned it was better to negotiate than fight. And so we had the 1996 Canada-U.S. Lumber Agreement that expired last year, a mixture of free and managed trade.
So what is now to be done? Here are some important contextual matters to keep in mind.

1. A rules-based trading system is much in Canada’s interest. In the Canada-U.S. bilateral trading relationship, one side is obviously vastly stronger in market share, wealth and its determination to play if necessary by its own rules. The only defence Canada has against the superior power of the U.S. is a rules-based system such as ones negotiated bilaterally and multilaterally.

2. The dispute-resolution panels established in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement remain somewhat misunderstood. Canada tried but failed in those negotiations to remove Canadian exports from U.S. trade law. U.S. negotiators, even if they had favored the idea, insisted Congress would never accept such a change. Canada then fell back to a secondary position – that of the bi-national panels. But these are charged only with adjudicating whether each country has applied its own trade laws properly and in conformity with the agreement.

3. A long fight continues in the U.S. between the executive and legislature over trade policy. Administrations tend to promote free-trade; Congress responds to particularistic, protectionist sentiments in states and districts.
The Congress in recent decades has been increasingly assertive in trade policy. This has resulted in changes to U.S. trade laws making it easier for U.S. economic interests to use them and to receive favourable rulings. The Byrd amendment of such concern to this industry is just one example: countervailing duties imposed on Canadian lumber go directly to U.S. producers.

4. Although tempting, it is unwise for Canada, the smaller partner in the relationship, to link a dispute in one industrial area such as softwood lumber to the economic interests of another. Occasional voices have been heard that Canada should somehow use U.S. need for additional supplies of Canadian energy as a lever for a resolution of the lumber dispute. We might ask the energy industry how it would like such linkage, and we know the answer. But beyond that, there is no point in jeopardizing one industry’s success to solve another’s. And it remains completely unclear just how we could accomplish this kind of linkage anyway.

5. The Coalition believes by all accounts that it is in a stronger position that in previous rounds of the lumber wars. It has lined up impressive congressional support. It can resist Administration pressure to accept a negotiated deal with Canada because a) the Canadian side will be doing the bleeding under the regime of U.S.-imposed duties, b) the Administration for reasons I mentioned a moment ago will not expend any political capital to get an agreement, c) the changes in U.S. laws favour the U.S. industry. Put crudely, the Coalition believes it has all its ducks in a line.

6. We have to remember that Canada enjoys a huge overall trade surplus with the United States, to which lumber makes an important contribution. It has been foolishly said (by the NDP’s Svend Robinson among others) that the U.S. is a free-trading country only when it suits its purposes. The huge U.S. trade and current account deficits give the lie to that silly argument. Canada’s overall trade surplus with the U.S. has been largely ignored in Washington. Instead, the vast majority of political attention surrounding the U.S.’ trade deficit remains focused on China, the European Union and Japan.

This observation leads me to what might be considered the hidden dynamic at work in this lumber dispute. A multitude of factors explains why Canadian lumber’s share of the U.S. market has grown to about 35 per cent, especially since the mid-1970s. No one factor can explain it, and many have been advanced, including U.S. policies restricting forest-cutting, larger available Canadian stands of lumber, lower Canadian population densities, better Canadian investments in technology, the failure of U.S. producers to promote wood aggressively against alternative products and, from the U.S. perspective, Canadian stumpage policies.

One factor has surely been the twenty-five year decline in the value of the Canadian dollar vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. I repeat that I am not drawing a direct cause-and-effect relationship, but the growing Canadian share of the U.S. market began to widen in the late 1970s, which is when the dollar began declining. The last month that the loonie and the greenback traded at par was November, 1976. No one would have predicted then that a quarter of a century later, the Canadian dollar would stand at about 63 cents (U.S.) (…)

(…) One thing Canadians have learned during the free-trade experience is that issues unresolved at that time remain unresolved. Americans complained then about Canadian cultural policies, supply management, the Canadian Wheat Board and forestry policy, and they still do. The Americans have long memories, and their political system invites continuous return to issues. That is because there are so many points of pressure in the U.S. system. If one committee will not take up an issue, another probably will. If one Senator has sufficient will and interest, he or she can keep alive an issue for years. There are a host of U.S. trade-remedy laws that can be used from safeguard relief to anti-dumping duties to countervailing duties to Section 301 investigations. The nature of the U.S. political system led one former Canadian Ambassador to Washington to quote Yogi Berra: It ain’t over ‘til it’s over, and then it ain’t over.

Stripped to its essence, the U.S. complaint about Canadian practices is ideological and highly nationalistic. The assumption, frequently stated, is that unless Canada adopts a system that copies or at least approximates the one Americans use for selling access to trees – an auction-based system – Canada is somehow implicitly subsidizing its industry. This is an assumption that no self-respecting country should prime facie accept: that unless things are done as the Americans think they should be done they are somehow wrong. There is something called American Exceptio-nalism. Americans, being so powerful, often do not realize how differently they are organizing matters in a certain way it must be right, and that if this assertion is contested that might will make right.

Canada is being asked to acquiesce indirectly in a form of extra-territorial application of American methods, despite the findings of objective panels that Canadian methods do not constitute a subsidy. The Congressional Research Service study to which I referred earlier summed up its section on comparing Canadian and U.S. fees by stating, “Evidence to demonstrate this possible disparity between U.S. and Canadian stumpage fees is widespread but inconclusive.” The same study examined the evidence about the effects on lumber prices of Canadian imports and concluded that the softwood lumber price is highly inelastic, with changes in price having more to do with the overall state of the housing market, in turn a factor related to overall economic conditions. Said the study, “in general and over the long term, changes in lumber supply have a modest impact on lumber prices.”

Stripped to its essence, the U.S. complaint about Canadian practices is ideological and highly nationalistic. The assumption, frequently stated, is that unless Canada adopts a system that copies or at least approximates the one Americans use for selling access to trees – an auction-based system – Canada is somehow implicitly subsidizing its industry. This is an assumption that no self-respecting country should prime facie accept: that unless things are done as the Americans think they should be done they are somehow wrong. There is something called American Exceptionalism. Americans, being so powerful, often do not realize how differently they arrange matters compared to other countries. They just assume that since they are organizing matters in a certain way it must be right, and that if this assertion is contested that might will make right.

Canada is being asked to acquiesce indirectly in a form of extra-territorial application of American methods, despite the findings of objective panels that Canadian methods do not constitute a subsidy. The Congressional Research Service study to which I referred earlier summed up its section on comparing Canadian and U.S. fees by stating, “Evidence to demonstrate this possible disparity between U.S. and Canadian stumpage fees is widespread but inconclusive.” The same study examined the evidence about the effects on lumber prices of Canadian imports and concluded that the softwood lumber price is highly inelastic, with changes in price having more to do with the overall state of the housing market, in turn a factor related to overall economic conditions. Said the study, “in general and over the long term, changes in lumber supply have a modest impact on lumber prices.”

If Canada were to negotiate another export-restraint agreement or self-impose an export tax, it would be conceding guilt. It cannot plausibly do that while simultaneously insisting on its virtue. For all these reasons, I conclude that Canada must fight these U.S. actions. It must not knuckle under and do what it has done in the past, even thought there is no guarantee Canada will ultimately win its case. The U.S., as I said, has changed its internal trade laws. The last bi-national panel divided on national lines and a majority of members was Canadian; the next panel might be composed of a majority of Americans and if the members divided again on national lines, Canada would lose. These appeals – to NAFTA or the WTO – take a very long time during which Canadian producers will be paying duties that go straight into American pockets. The impact on the industry, especially for smaller lumber producers, will be severe. Perhaps over time, provinces should review how they regulate the sale of forest products. British Columbia and Alberta have already signalled their desire to make changes in the direction of an auction-based pricing system, but of course these have been predictably dismissed as inadequate by the coalition for Fair Lumber Imports. If Canadian provinces for their own purposes wish to make changes in how they price lumber and organize their regulatory regimes, that is for them to decide – not under U.S. duress but because it might make for more economic efficiency. This is a matter for British Columbians, Albertans and other Canadians to decide, not Americans, because the current Canadian arrangements have been investigated impartially and not found wanting in terms of trade agreements.

What I greatly fear might happen is that Canadian lumber interests and provincial government will under U.S. pressure decide that only by changing our entire system of pricing wood, valuing or owning land and adopting U.S. environmental assumptions ca we avoid these duties now and forever; but that to do so would mean abandoning the legal precedents that have been in our favor, turn over our operating assumptions for those that have not at all been proven superior south of the border, and essentially capitulate to unjust and unfair U.S. political pressure. As Canadian trade lawyer Lawrence Herman recently argued: “Adjusting practices of long standing under intense time pressure and in the context of a bitter and highly charged bilateral dispute is unlikely to produce a well balanced package.”

What I believe should be done is this. First, Canada should continue to seek a negotiated settlement with the U.S. but not one based on demands for changes to this industry of the kind we have seen from the Coalition for Fair Lumber and its political supporters. Second, we should continue by all means to make our cast to sympathetic and powerful Americans, especially importers of Canadian lumber who are penalized by U.S. actions. Third, we should pursue every legal means to uphold this country’s rights. Thus, I applaud Canfor’s audacious arbitration claim under NAFTA Chapter 11’s investment provisions, seeking $250-million in compensation from the U.S. government. This excellent initiative gives Canada some leverage, and may have some chance of succeeding. We should obviously use every means at our disposal to seek a favourable ruling from the Word Trade Organization and we should seek judicial review by the U.S. Court of International Trade of the Commerce Department’s methodology and calculations.

These multi-faceted legal challenges will take time, and we must be honest in admitting that they might not be successful. But in the meantime, thousands of lumber workers are losing their jogs through no fault of their own. They need sympathy, to be sure, but they also need help from their fellow Canadians. And that help can only come through the federal government.

Mil workers are being laid off. Loggers are being idled. Truckers are grinding to a halt. Working people and their families are suffering because of a highly political and unfair trade action. These people are losing their livelihoods, even temporarily, not through the cycle of market forces, something the unemployment insurance scheme is designed to cushion. They are paying the price for a unilateral U.S. decision to impose whopping duties that were calculated by U.S. authorities after receiving complaints by U.S. lumber interests supported by U.S. politicians (…)

(…) The details of an assistance package for workers in the various parts of the lumber industry could be discussed with unions and the provincial governments. Of course, an assistance package would be complicated to organize, and there will be inevitable debates about how much money should be set aside and how it should be distributed. And no package of assistance should be organized unless it meshes with restructuring plans for the industry envisaged by some provinces, noticeably in British Columbia.

But the principle is simple: Canadian workers and their families are being hurt by an unfair trade action, and they should be helped by their fellow citizens while the federal government and private industry tries to reverse this unfair U.S. decision.

Élargissement du champ d’application du décret de la construction
L’industrie craint de doubler ses coûts d’entretien
Des consultations
Dans un article non signé publié dans son bulletin Le Papetier (vol. 37, no. 4), l’AIFQ a énuméré divers facteurs qui lui font dire que cette intention gouvernementale nuira sérieusement à la modernisation des entreprises forestières. De 1992 à 2000, les investissements combinés des industries papetières et des scieries étaient en moyenne de 1,1 milliard $ par année, soit 27 % des sommes dépensées par l’ensemble des secteurs industriels du Québec.
Selon Germain Gaudreault, responsable du dossier à l’AMBSQ et à l’AIFQ, de nombreux soudeurs, mécaniciens et électriciens à l’emploi des entreprises sous-traitantes de l’industrie forestière perdront leur travail si ce projet se concrétise. Les scieries, plus particulièrement, font faire beaucoup d’entretien par le personnel de ces PME locales. « Ces gens-là se sentent chez eux quand ils viennent à l’usine », a-t-il raconté lors d’une conversation téléphonique le 11 janvier dernier.
Les usines sont malheureusement installées dans des régions où la main-d’œuvre spécialisée est rare. Or, la Commission de la construction n’émet plus de cartes, car l’industrie de la construction est en manque de chantiers ces temps-ci. « Les usines devront importer de la main-d’œuvre, à grands frais, si elles ne peuvent plus embaucher ces gens-là », a ajouté M. Gaudreault. L’industrie forestière prétend que ces coûts d’installation et d’entretien des équipements vont doubler si le gouvernement va de l’avant; elle demande donc au gouvernement de maintenir le statu quo.

Pas mise ne vigueur
Dans la loi R-20, il existe une disposition au deuxième paragraphe de l’article 1a) traitant de la définition d’employeur professionnel. Elle y est inscrite depuis 1993, mais n’a jamais été mise en vigueur. Le premier ministre Bernard Landry aurait acquiescé à une demande en ce sens du président de la FTQ, Henri Massé, lors d’une rencontre en mai 2001.
En juin, puis en septembre dernier, les représentants de l’industrie ont eu une confirmation de la part du ministre responsable, Jean Rochon, que le gouvernement envisageait d’élargir cette définition d’employeur professionnel aux entrepreneurs sous-traitants de l’industrie manufacturière. M. Rochon aurait promis de faire réaliser une étude d’impacts. Celle-ci devait être faite l’automne dernier, mais rien n’a été fait.
Finalement, à la suite des pressions de l’Opposition, la Commission de l’économie et du travail a pris un mandat d’initiative. Celle-ci devrait tenir des consultations publiques spécifiquement sur cette question d’ici la fin du mois de février. L’annonce en a été faite le 19 décembre dernier par le député André Tranchemontagne (Mont-Royal), porte-parole de l’Opposition officielle en matière d’emploi et de travail. Mais au moment de mettre sous presse, le calendrier des commissions de l’Assemblée nationale ne faisait toujours aucune mention de cette consultation.
Source : journal Le Monde Forestier, février 2002

Scierie P.H. Lemay renaîtra à L’Ascension
La Scierie P.H. Lemay, rasée par les flammes à la fin de mars 2001, sera finalement reconstruite, mais pas sur son emplacement d’origine à Saint-François-de-Sales, au sud du lac Saint-Jean. Les propriétaires, Régis Lemay et Paperboard International, une filiale de Papiers Cascades, ont plutôt choisi d’implanter les nouvelles installations dans la municipalité de L’Ascension, au nord d’Alma.
La future scierie de 30 000 pieds carrés regroupera la production de la scierie détruite et celle de Scierie Mailloux de Delisle, acquise tout récemment au coût d’environ 2 millions $. L’optimisation des équipements devrait permettre une amélioration de 17 % de la récupération de la fibre.
Les contrats d’approvisionnement et d’aménagement forestier des deux usines seront jumelés. La nouvelle scierie pourra ainsi bénéficier d’un volume total de 158 000 m3 de bois, situé en grande partie aux alentours de L’Ascension.
Ce serait d’ailleurs, selon Régis Lemay, la raison principale motivant la reconstruction dans cette localité des installations de Scierie P.H. Lemay. « Nous allons économiser des sommes considérables en frais de transport. Comme la nouvelle usine sera située sur un chemin forestier, nous allons pouvoir employer des camions hors normes », a-t-il fait valoir. Le tout permettrait d’économiser de 800 000 $ à un million de dollars par année.
La future usine a obtenu un approvisionnement supplémentaire de 27 000 m3 provenant des forêts publiques. De plus, l’entreprise négocie avec le Syndicat des producteurs de bois en vue d’une entente d’approvisionnement à long terme, de manière à pouvoir opérer l’usine sur deux quarts de travail avec un volume total dépassant les 210 000 m3.
D’ici la fin de l’année, une trentaine de personnes oeuvreront chez Rabotage 3R, à Saint-François-de-Sales, tandis qu’une quarantaine d’autres seront affectées à L’Ascension. La totalité des travailleurs de Scierie P.H. Lemay, a assuré M. Lemay, retrouveront leur emploi. Une vingtaine d’employés seront relocalisés à L’Ascension; ils pourront toutefois bénéficier d’un système de transport en commun.
Source : journal Le Monde Forestier, février 2002

Turnkey Cogeneration Systems
Biomass-fueled energy

Biomass is a renewable energy source. Its energy come from the sun. As long as plants continue to grow, there is a perpetual source of energy available to convert into thermal and electrical energy that we can use. Biomass materials can include the following :
• Saw dust, bark, and other wood waste
• Agricultural products such as peanut shells, rice hulls, corn, wheat straw, switch grass, and orange peels.
• Animal byproducts and residuals
Burning biomass fuels to produce energy has significant benefits compared to burning non-renewable fossil fuels.
• Burning fossil fuels produces large amounts of SO2, a major contributor to air pollution; biomass fuels produces very little SO2.
• Biomass fuels are considered a “net zero” producer of CO2 because the amount of CO2 released upon burning is equivalent to the amount of CO2 taken out of the air during the fuel’s growth cycle.
• Biomass fuels are considerably cheaper than fossil fuels, and are often considered a waste product that must be disposed of in some way.
• Burning biomass fuels will greatly reduce, and sometimes eliminate, disposal costs and the associated contribution to landfills.
All of these factors make biomass-fueled energy generation systems attractive, both ecologically and economically, for the on-site production of usable forms of energy.
Cogeneration : dual energy
A typical cogeneration system converts a burnable fuel into a combination of thermal energy and electrical energy. In most systems, combustion heat is used to create steam. This steam drives a turbine, which turns a generator to produce electricity.
Usable thermal energy can be either in the form of steam, hot water, or hot air, depending on your particular needs. The results is a very efficient extraction of energy available in the biomass fuel, with the end result being a tremendous reduction in the amount of energy you have to purchase for your plant or mill.
Typical system economics
The economics of a biomass-fueled cogeneration system can be observed in the example show here. In this example, we examine a mill with 50 tons per day of waste wood material. This is currently disposed of at a landfill at a cost of $10 per ton. If the plant operates 250 days per year, this amounts to an expense of $125,000 per year.
The mill’s average electrical demand is 700 kW per hour. Assuming 16 hours per day of operation, 5 days per week, this equates to an annual electrical consumption of 2,800,000 kWhr. If the mill pays $.07/kWhr, the annual electrical usage costs $196,000.
This mill also operates a dry kiln for drying lumber. The kiln operates 5 days a week with an average consumption o 5 MMBTU/hr. The fuel used is natural gas, at a cost of $9/MMBTU. Annual expenses for natural gas equal $270,000, and the combined expenses for electrical and natural gas energy equal $591,000 per year.
Installation of a complete biomass-fueled cogeneration system, consisting of a combustion system, steam boiler, and steam turbine generator, will produce steam for the kiln operation and electricity to run the mill, all from the waste wood currently being landfilled. The energy generation system will be operated 24 hours per day, 5 days per week, consuming biomass fuel at the rate of 2.08 tons per hour. Assuming the heating value of the wood waste is 8500 BTU/# and the energy conversion process is 80 percent efficient, there will be 28,288,000 BTU of steam available of producing electricity and for operating the kiln.
Deducting 5 million BTU/hr for the kiln operation, a single-stage turbine with an air cooled condenser would produce about 700 kW, or about 4,200,000 kWhr/year. This is in excess of the mill’s needs. If the excess is sold back to the local utility at $.04/kWhr, an additional revenue stream of $56,000 per year would be generated. We will assume this is equal to the system’s operating costs.
The capital costs for such a facility are approximately $1.6 million. This will provide the mill owner with a return on investment of 2.7 years.
Technology partners
BEC brings together firms that are leaders in their respective fields. Advanced Recycling Equipment, Inc. is a supplier of high quality Challenger® grinders and other material handling equipment. They also are the North American representative for Talbott’s Heating Ltd., a manufacturer of biomass combustion systems that use an extended combustion zone to virtually eliminate VOC emissions and leave very little particulate, with very low NOx content. Talbott’s has been in business for more than 30 years and has over 3,000 units installed word-wide.
SEECO (Southern Engineering & Equipment Co.) has been producing and installing custom steam turbine generator systems for 30 years, with systems in operation across the country and overseas.
Pulling all the pieces together with automation and controls systems is Revere Control Systems, Inc., an expert in industrial controls and automation with more than 20 years of experience serving a wide variety of industries.
For more information, please contact :
Dave Gamble, President of Biomass Energy Concepts LLC
Phone : (205)824-1205, ext. 3111
E-mail : dgamble@reverecontrol.com
Website : www.co-generation.com

Système d’humidification sans air Humijet
Seul manufacturier au Québec d’une technologie innovatrice
qui révolutionne l’humidification industrielle
Le système d’humidification sans air Humijet permet de maintenir ou d’ajouter un taux d’humidité relative dans l’air ambiant sans l’apport d’air comprimé ou de vapeur. C’est un système de conception et de qualité industrielle, simple, compact, peu coûteux et facile d’installation.
Il est sain à l’utilisation (car il ne nécessite pas de traitement chimique de l’eau et ne contient pas des réserves d’eau morte ou stagnante propice à propagation des bactéries dans l’air). C’est un système très économique et efficace à l’utilisation compte tenu qu’il nécessite qu’une pompe à injection pour la vaporisation de l’eau. Il est aussi simple d’entretien, étant donné qu’il est constitué de peu de pièces.
Le système d’humidification sans air Humijet est une alternative économique et flexible pour tous les besoins en humidification dans les industries et les institutions lorsque comparé à un système d’humidification traditionnel.
Quelques avantages du système d’humidification Humijet
• Il permet de réduire les coûts de chauffage tout en obtenant un confort accru
• En été, les besoins en climatisation sont moindres car il réduit la température de l’air ambiant
• Il améliore la qualité de l’air et de l’environnement
• Il réduit les polluants en suspension dans l’air
• Faible consommation énergétique, il ne nécessite pas l’utilisation d’air comprimé ou de vapeur
• Faible coût d’installation, d’opération et d’entretien
• Réduit l’électricité statique et les risques d’explosion et d’incendie
• Il est fiable, sûr et très silencieux à l’utilisation
• Ses capacités sont sans limites; il est facilement expansible
• Il n’y a pas de temps d’attente lors de son démarrage, la vaporisation est instantanée.
Technologie
Le système d’humidification Humijet est constitué de peu de pièces; principalement d’une pompe d’injection d’eau haute pression. Cette pompe est alimentée par un système de filtration d’eau pouvant être raccordé dans certains cas à un système de filtration d’eau à osmose offert en option. Un réseau compact de tuyauterie en acier inoxydable vient ensuite relier la pompe d’injection aux buses d’atomisation également en acier inoxydable.
Le principe de fonctionnement est basé sur une pompe à injection d’eau relié à l’eau de l’aqueduc et alimentant un réseau de buses d’atomisation. Lorsque le niveau minimum d’humidité est atteint dans la pièce, un hygromètre assisté d’un contrôleur, commande à la pompe d’injection d’eau de fournir un débit et une pression pré-programmé aux buses de vaporisation. Un système de monitoring assure un niveau de sécurité sans faille en cas de bris de tuyaux, de manque d’eau ou de surchauffe de la pompe d’injection.
Quelques exemples d’application
Bois ouvré, meuble, portes et fenêtres, usine de transformation et de finition du bois :
• Conserve automatiquement un niveau précis d’humidité dans l’air ambiant
• Élimine les rejets dus au craquement,
fendillement, et contraintes de torsion dans les matériaux
• Maintient une stabilité dimensionnelle des matériaux
• Augmente la performance des opérations de collage
• Réduit les particules de poussière en suspension dans l’air ambiant
• Diminue les rejets, augmente le niveau
d’adhésion, diminue le temps de séchage et stabilise le fini de surface pour les opérations de peinture et de finition.

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