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Volume
18 No 1
2e trimestre 2002 Second Quarter
NOUVELLES
NEWS
Remarks by Jeffrey Simpson
Canadians must fight U.S. actions
We gather amidst Lumber IV, the fourth round in a twenty-years battle
by certain U.S. lumber producers to restrict Canadian lumber exports to
the United States. All in this room know the intricacies of the lumber
industry better than I do. My only extremely modest claim is to have watched
rounds One through Three, to have written extensively about the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement and to
have written a long book two years ago about certain aspects of Canada-American
relations.
My comments today are therefore those of an interested observer rather
than those of a lumber expert, trade lawyer or government policy-maker.They
are also those from someone who has not been hesitant to criticize certain
Canadian patterns of behavior vis-à-vis our Americans friends,
especially the sense of moral superiority that often infuses Canadian
attitudes towards the United States.
They are also those from someone who has not been hesitant to criticize
certain Canadian patterns of behavior vis-à-vis our Americans friends,
especially the sense of moral superiority that often infuses Canadian
attitudes towards the United States. A political market does exist in
Canada for preaching this countrys allegedly superior virtues, but
while I bow to none in my patriotism, building that patriotism on putting
down another country strikes me as hollow and self-defeating, because
it blinds us to problems we should otherwise address. I am not therefore
a habitual bashers of the United States (
)
(
) Obviously, Lumber IV is being provoked by U.S. lumber producers,
although it is significant that major lumber companies with interests
in Canada such as Louisiana Pacific and Weyerhauser are sitting on the
sidelines. The aggrieved U.S. producers game is very simple: to
protect as much market share as possible, to push up domestic lumber prices
and to increase profits. Theirs tactics are equally transparent: to use
U.S. trade law to secure these ends and to line up as much political support
as possible. You know the history of Lumber I, Lumber II and Lumber III.
The same dynamics were at work then as now.
The Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports has done well thus far in two respects.
First, ii got 51 Senators, Democrat and Republican, to sign a letter urging
resolution of this dispute on terms favorable to the U.S. or, failing
that, to hit Canada hard with the full force of U.S. trade remedy laws.
Second and this is of political importance it secured support
from a variety of environmental groups. This support brought some liberal
Democratic Senators on board. It also widened the coalition hectoring
Canadian lumber imports. In essence, the environment has now been improbably
been conscripted for the U.S. industrys fight for market share,
higher prices and larger profits. To compound matters further, certain
extremely gullible Canadian environmental groups, including some in British
Columbia, have joined the battle. These environmentalists on both sides
of the border should be reminded of a conclusion drawn by a study of the
softwood lumber dispute from the U.S. Congressional Research Service,
a bipartisan research agency, in February, 2001: Whether Canadian
forests are in better condition than, or are more degraded than, U.S.
forests is not clear from existing data. Case unproven, in other
words, by the U.S. own admission.In Lumber II and Lumber III, Canada
imposed an export tax on itself and consented to a quota restriction with
tariffs applied for exports above the quota of 14.7-billion board feet.
Both of these came as a direct result of political pressure, trade actions
and threats from U.S. interests. Although Canadian rhetoric continues
to insist that Canada wants free trade in lumber restored
with the U.S., this misstates what has actually occurred. Since the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement there has not been free trade, but variations
of managed trade to which Canada, under duress, has consented.
You can therefore easily understand why U.S. interests do not take seriously
Canadas various victories before NAFTA tribunals, because these
have neither validated the Canadian position in U.S. eyes. No sooner did
these panels uphold Canadas position in the mid-1990s than trade
actions were again threatened, political allies introduced bills in the
U.S. Congress, and Canada reckoned it was better to negotiate than fight.
And so we had the 1996 Canada-U.S. Lumber Agreement that expired last
year, a mixture of free and managed trade.
So what is now to be done? Here are some important contextual matters
to keep in mind.
1. A rules-based trading system is much in Canadas interest.
In the Canada-U.S. bilateral trading relationship, one side is obviously
vastly stronger in market share, wealth and its determination to play
if necessary by its own rules. The only defence Canada has against the
superior power of the U.S. is a rules-based system such as ones negotiated
bilaterally and multilaterally.
2. The dispute-resolution panels established in the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement remain somewhat misunderstood. Canada tried but failed
in those negotiations to remove Canadian exports from U.S. trade law.
U.S. negotiators, even if they had favored the idea, insisted Congress
would never accept such a change. Canada then fell back to a secondary
position that of the bi-national panels. But these are charged
only with adjudicating whether each country has applied its own trade
laws properly and in conformity with the agreement.
3. A long fight continues in the U.S. between the executive and
legislature over trade policy. Administrations tend to promote free-trade;
Congress responds to particularistic, protectionist sentiments in states
and districts.
The Congress in recent decades has been increasingly assertive in trade
policy. This has resulted in changes to U.S. trade laws making it easier
for U.S. economic interests to use them and to receive favourable rulings.
The Byrd amendment of such concern to this industry is just one example:
countervailing duties imposed on Canadian lumber go directly to U.S. producers.
4. Although tempting, it is unwise for Canada, the smaller partner
in the relationship, to link a dispute in one industrial area such as
softwood lumber to the economic interests of another. Occasional voices
have been heard that Canada should somehow use U.S. need for additional
supplies of Canadian energy as a lever for a resolution of the lumber
dispute. We might ask the energy industry how it would like such linkage,
and we know the answer. But beyond that, there is no point in jeopardizing
one industrys success to solve anothers. And it remains completely
unclear just how we could accomplish this kind of linkage anyway.
5. The Coalition believes by all accounts that it is in a stronger
position that in previous rounds of the lumber wars. It has lined up impressive
congressional support. It can resist Administration pressure to accept
a negotiated deal with Canada because a) the Canadian side will be doing
the bleeding under the regime of U.S.-imposed duties, b) the Administration
for reasons I mentioned a moment ago will not expend any political capital
to get an agreement, c) the changes in U.S. laws favour the U.S. industry.
Put crudely, the Coalition believes it has all its ducks in a line.
6. We have to remember that Canada enjoys a huge overall trade
surplus with the United States, to which lumber makes an important contribution.
It has been foolishly said (by the NDPs Svend Robinson among others)
that the U.S. is a free-trading country only when it suits its purposes.
The huge U.S. trade and current account deficits give the lie to that
silly argument. Canadas overall trade surplus with the U.S. has
been largely ignored in Washington. Instead, the vast majority of political
attention surrounding the U.S. trade deficit remains focused on
China, the European Union and Japan.
This observation leads me to what might be considered the hidden dynamic
at work in this lumber dispute. A multitude of factors explains why Canadian
lumbers share of the U.S. market has grown to about 35 per cent,
especially since the mid-1970s. No one factor can explain it, and many
have been advanced, including U.S. policies restricting forest-cutting,
larger available Canadian stands of lumber, lower Canadian population
densities, better Canadian investments in technology, the failure of U.S.
producers to promote wood aggressively against alternative products and,
from the U.S. perspective, Canadian stumpage policies.
One factor has surely been the twenty-five year decline in the value of
the Canadian dollar vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. I repeat that I
am not drawing a direct cause-and-effect relationship, but the growing
Canadian share of the U.S. market began to widen in the late 1970s, which
is when the dollar began declining. The last month that the loonie and
the greenback traded at par was November, 1976. No one would have predicted
then that a quarter of a century later, the Canadian dollar would stand
at about 63 cents (U.S.) (
)
(
) One thing Canadians have learned during the free-trade experience
is that issues unresolved at that time remain unresolved. Americans complained
then about Canadian cultural policies, supply management, the Canadian
Wheat Board and forestry policy, and they still do. The Americans have
long memories, and their political system invites continuous return to
issues. That is because there are so many points of pressure in the U.S.
system. If one committee will not take up an issue, another probably will.
If one Senator has sufficient will and interest, he or she can keep alive
an issue for years. There are a host of U.S. trade-remedy laws that can
be used from safeguard relief to anti-dumping duties to countervailing
duties to Section 301 investigations. The nature of the U.S. political
system led one former Canadian Ambassador to Washington to quote Yogi
Berra: It aint over til its over, and then it aint
over.
Stripped to its essence, the U.S. complaint about Canadian practices is
ideological and highly nationalistic. The assumption, frequently stated,
is that unless Canada adopts a system that copies or at least approximates
the one Americans use for selling access to trees an auction-based
system Canada is somehow implicitly subsidizing its industry. This
is an assumption that no self-respecting country should prime facie accept:
that unless things are done as the Americans think they should be done
they are somehow wrong. There is something called American Exceptio-nalism.
Americans, being so powerful, often do not realize how differently they
are organizing matters in a certain way it must be right, and that if
this assertion is contested that might will make right.
Canada is being asked to acquiesce indirectly in a form of extra-territorial
application of American methods, despite the findings of objective panels
that Canadian methods do not constitute a subsidy. The Congressional Research
Service study to which I referred earlier summed up its section on comparing
Canadian and U.S. fees by stating, Evidence to demonstrate this
possible disparity between U.S. and Canadian stumpage fees is widespread
but inconclusive. The same study examined the evidence about the
effects on lumber prices of Canadian imports and concluded that the softwood
lumber price is highly inelastic, with changes in price having more to
do with the overall state of the housing market, in turn a factor related
to overall economic conditions. Said the study, in general and over
the long term, changes in lumber supply have a modest impact on lumber
prices.
Stripped to its essence, the U.S. complaint about Canadian practices is
ideological and highly nationalistic. The assumption, frequently stated,
is that unless Canada adopts a system that copies or at least approximates
the one Americans use for selling access to trees an auction-based
system Canada is somehow implicitly subsidizing its industry. This
is an assumption that no self-respecting country should prime facie accept:
that unless things are done as the Americans think they should be done
they are somehow wrong. There is something called American Exceptionalism.
Americans, being so powerful, often do not realize how differently they
arrange matters compared to other countries. They just assume that since
they are organizing matters in a certain way it must be right, and that
if this assertion is contested that might will make right.
Canada is being asked to acquiesce indirectly in a form of extra-territorial
application of American methods, despite the findings of objective panels
that Canadian methods do not constitute a subsidy. The Congressional Research
Service study to which I referred earlier summed up its section on comparing
Canadian and U.S. fees by stating, Evidence to demonstrate this
possible disparity between U.S. and Canadian stumpage fees is widespread
but inconclusive. The same study examined the evidence about the
effects on lumber prices of Canadian imports and concluded that the softwood
lumber price is highly inelastic, with changes in price having more to
do with the overall state of the housing market, in turn a factor related
to overall economic conditions. Said the study, in general and over
the long term, changes in lumber supply have a modest impact on lumber
prices.
If Canada were to negotiate another export-restraint agreement or self-impose
an export tax, it would be conceding guilt. It cannot plausibly do that
while simultaneously insisting on its virtue. For all these reasons, I
conclude that Canada must fight these U.S. actions. It must not knuckle
under and do what it has done in the past, even thought there is no guarantee
Canada will ultimately win its case. The U.S., as I said, has changed
its internal trade laws. The last bi-national panel divided on national
lines and a majority of members was Canadian; the next panel might be
composed of a majority of Americans and if the members divided again on
national lines, Canada would lose. These appeals to NAFTA or the
WTO take a very long time during which Canadian producers will
be paying duties that go straight into American pockets. The impact on
the industry, especially for smaller lumber producers, will be severe.
Perhaps over time, provinces should review how they regulate the sale
of forest products. British Columbia and Alberta have already signalled
their desire to make changes in the direction of an auction-based pricing
system, but of course these have been predictably dismissed as inadequate
by the coalition for Fair Lumber Imports. If Canadian provinces for their
own purposes wish to make changes in how they price lumber and organize
their regulatory regimes, that is for them to decide not under
U.S. duress but because it might make for more economic efficiency. This
is a matter for British Columbians, Albertans and other Canadians to decide,
not Americans, because the current Canadian arrangements have been investigated
impartially and not found wanting in terms of trade agreements.
What I greatly fear might happen is that Canadian lumber interests and
provincial government will under U.S. pressure decide that only by changing
our entire system of pricing wood, valuing or owning land and adopting
U.S. environmental assumptions ca we avoid these duties now and forever;
but that to do so would mean abandoning the legal precedents that have
been in our favor, turn over our operating assumptions for those that
have not at all been proven superior south of the border, and essentially
capitulate to unjust and unfair U.S. political pressure. As Canadian trade
lawyer Lawrence Herman recently argued: Adjusting practices of long
standing under intense time pressure and in the context of a bitter and
highly charged bilateral dispute is unlikely to produce a well balanced
package.
What I believe should be done is this. First, Canada should continue to
seek a negotiated settlement with the U.S. but not one based on demands
for changes to this industry of the kind we have seen from the Coalition
for Fair Lumber and its political supporters. Second, we should continue
by all means to make our cast to sympathetic and powerful Americans, especially
importers of Canadian lumber who are penalized by U.S. actions. Third,
we should pursue every legal means to uphold this countrys rights.
Thus, I applaud Canfors audacious arbitration claim under NAFTA
Chapter 11s investment provisions, seeking $250-million in compensation
from the U.S. government. This excellent initiative gives Canada some
leverage, and may have some chance of succeeding. We should obviously
use every means at our disposal to seek a favourable ruling from the Word
Trade Organization and we should seek judicial review by the U.S. Court
of International Trade of the Commerce Departments methodology and
calculations.
These multi-faceted legal challenges will take time, and we must be honest
in admitting that they might not be successful. But in the meantime, thousands
of lumber workers are losing their jogs through no fault of their own.
They need sympathy, to be sure, but they also need help from their fellow
Canadians. And that help can only come through the federal government.
Mil workers are being laid off. Loggers are being idled. Truckers are
grinding to a halt. Working people and their families are suffering because
of a highly political and unfair trade action. These people are losing
their livelihoods, even temporarily, not through the cycle of market forces,
something the unemployment insurance scheme is designed to cushion. They
are paying the price for a unilateral U.S. decision to impose whopping
duties that were calculated by U.S. authorities after receiving complaints
by U.S. lumber interests supported by U.S. politicians (
)
(
) The details of an assistance package for workers in the various
parts of the lumber industry could be discussed with unions and the provincial
governments. Of course, an assistance package would be complicated to
organize, and there will be inevitable debates about how much money should
be set aside and how it should be distributed. And no package of assistance
should be organized unless it meshes with restructuring plans for the
industry envisaged by some provinces, noticeably in British Columbia.
But the principle is simple: Canadian workers and their families are being
hurt by an unfair trade action, and they should be helped by their fellow
citizens while the federal government and private industry tries to reverse
this unfair U.S. decision.
Élargissement du champ dapplication
du décret de la construction
Lindustrie craint de doubler ses coûts
dentretien
Des consultations
Dans un article non signé publié dans son bulletin Le Papetier
(vol. 37, no. 4), lAIFQ a énuméré divers facteurs
qui lui font dire que cette intention gouvernementale nuira sérieusement
à la modernisation des entreprises forestières. De 1992
à 2000, les investissements combinés des industries papetières
et des scieries étaient en moyenne de 1,1 milliard $ par année,
soit 27 % des sommes dépensées par lensemble des secteurs
industriels du Québec.
Selon Germain Gaudreault, responsable du dossier à lAMBSQ
et à lAIFQ, de nombreux soudeurs, mécaniciens et électriciens
à lemploi des entreprises sous-traitantes de lindustrie
forestière perdront leur travail si ce projet se concrétise.
Les scieries, plus particulièrement, font faire beaucoup dentretien
par le personnel de ces PME locales. « Ces gens-là se sentent
chez eux quand ils viennent à lusine », a-t-il raconté
lors dune conversation téléphonique le 11 janvier
dernier.
Les usines sont malheureusement installées dans des régions
où la main-duvre spécialisée est rare.
Or, la Commission de la construction német plus de cartes,
car lindustrie de la construction est en manque de chantiers ces
temps-ci. « Les usines devront importer de la main-duvre,
à grands frais, si elles ne peuvent plus embaucher ces gens-là
», a ajouté M. Gaudreault. Lindustrie forestière
prétend que ces coûts dinstallation et dentretien
des équipements vont doubler si le gouvernement va de lavant;
elle demande donc au gouvernement de maintenir le statu quo.
Pas mise ne vigueur
Dans la loi R-20, il existe une disposition au deuxième paragraphe
de larticle 1a) traitant de la définition demployeur
professionnel. Elle y est inscrite depuis 1993, mais na jamais été
mise en vigueur. Le premier ministre Bernard Landry aurait acquiescé
à une demande en ce sens du président de la FTQ, Henri Massé,
lors dune rencontre en mai 2001.
En juin, puis en septembre dernier, les représentants de lindustrie
ont eu une confirmation de la part du ministre responsable, Jean Rochon,
que le gouvernement envisageait délargir cette définition
demployeur professionnel aux entrepreneurs sous-traitants de lindustrie
manufacturière. M. Rochon aurait promis de faire réaliser
une étude dimpacts. Celle-ci devait être faite lautomne
dernier, mais rien na été fait.
Finalement, à la suite des pressions de lOpposition, la Commission
de léconomie et du travail a pris un mandat dinitiative.
Celle-ci devrait tenir des consultations publiques spécifiquement
sur cette question dici la fin du mois de février. Lannonce
en a été faite le 19 décembre dernier par le député
André Tranchemontagne (Mont-Royal), porte-parole de lOpposition
officielle en matière demploi et de travail. Mais au moment
de mettre sous presse, le calendrier des commissions de lAssemblée
nationale ne faisait toujours aucune mention de cette consultation.
Source : journal Le Monde Forestier, février 2002
Scierie P.H. Lemay renaîtra à
LAscension
La Scierie P.H. Lemay, rasée par les flammes à la fin de
mars 2001, sera finalement reconstruite, mais pas sur son emplacement
dorigine à Saint-François-de-Sales, au sud du lac
Saint-Jean. Les propriétaires, Régis Lemay et Paperboard
International, une filiale de Papiers Cascades, ont plutôt choisi
dimplanter les nouvelles installations dans la municipalité
de LAscension, au nord dAlma.
La future scierie de 30 000 pieds carrés regroupera la production
de la scierie détruite et celle de Scierie Mailloux de Delisle,
acquise tout récemment au coût denviron 2 millions
$. Loptimisation des équipements devrait permettre une amélioration
de 17 % de la récupération de la fibre.
Les contrats dapprovisionnement et daménagement forestier
des deux usines seront jumelés. La nouvelle scierie pourra ainsi
bénéficier dun volume total de 158 000 m3 de bois,
situé en grande partie aux alentours de LAscension.
Ce serait dailleurs, selon Régis Lemay, la raison principale
motivant la reconstruction dans cette localité des installations
de Scierie P.H. Lemay. « Nous allons économiser des sommes
considérables en frais de transport. Comme la nouvelle usine sera
située sur un chemin forestier, nous allons pouvoir employer des
camions hors normes », a-t-il fait valoir. Le tout permettrait déconomiser
de 800 000 $ à un million de dollars par année.
La future usine a obtenu un approvisionnement supplémentaire de
27 000 m3 provenant des forêts publiques. De plus, lentreprise
négocie avec le Syndicat des producteurs de bois en vue dune
entente dapprovisionnement à long terme, de manière
à pouvoir opérer lusine sur deux quarts de travail
avec un volume total dépassant les 210 000 m3.
Dici la fin de lannée, une trentaine de personnes oeuvreront
chez Rabotage 3R, à Saint-François-de-Sales, tandis quune
quarantaine dautres seront affectées à LAscension.
La totalité des travailleurs de Scierie P.H. Lemay, a assuré
M. Lemay, retrouveront leur emploi. Une vingtaine demployés
seront relocalisés à LAscension; ils pourront toutefois
bénéficier dun système de transport en commun.
Source : journal Le Monde Forestier, février 2002
Turnkey Cogeneration Systems
Biomass-fueled energy
Biomass is a renewable energy source. Its energy come from the sun. As
long as plants continue to grow, there is a perpetual source of energy
available to convert into thermal and electrical energy that we can use.
Biomass materials can include the following :
Saw dust, bark, and other wood waste
Agricultural products such as peanut shells, rice hulls, corn,
wheat straw, switch grass, and orange peels.
Animal byproducts and residuals
Burning biomass fuels to produce energy has significant benefits compared
to burning non-renewable fossil fuels.
Burning fossil fuels produces large amounts of SO2, a major contributor
to air pollution; biomass fuels produces very little SO2.
Biomass fuels are considered a net zero producer of
CO2 because the amount of CO2 released upon burning is equivalent to the
amount of CO2 taken out of the air during the fuels growth cycle.
Biomass fuels are considerably cheaper than fossil fuels, and are
often considered a waste product that must be disposed of in some way.
Burning biomass fuels will greatly reduce, and sometimes eliminate,
disposal costs and the associated contribution to landfills.
All of these factors make biomass-fueled energy generation systems attractive,
both ecologically and economically, for the on-site production of usable
forms of energy.
Cogeneration : dual energy
A typical cogeneration system converts a burnable fuel into a combination
of thermal energy and electrical energy. In most systems, combustion heat
is used to create steam. This steam drives a turbine, which turns a generator
to produce electricity.
Usable thermal energy can be either in the form of steam, hot water, or
hot air, depending on your particular needs. The results is a very efficient
extraction of energy available in the biomass fuel, with the end result
being a tremendous reduction in the amount of energy you have to purchase
for your plant or mill.
Typical system economics
The economics of a biomass-fueled cogeneration system can be observed
in the example show here. In this example, we examine a mill with 50 tons
per day of waste wood material. This is currently disposed of at a landfill
at a cost of $10 per ton. If the plant operates 250 days per year, this
amounts to an expense of $125,000 per year.
The mills average electrical demand is 700 kW per hour. Assuming
16 hours per day of operation, 5 days per week, this equates to an annual
electrical consumption of 2,800,000 kWhr. If the mill pays $.07/kWhr,
the annual electrical usage costs $196,000.
This mill also operates a dry kiln for drying lumber. The kiln operates
5 days a week with an average consumption o 5 MMBTU/hr. The fuel used
is natural gas, at a cost of $9/MMBTU. Annual expenses for natural gas
equal $270,000, and the combined expenses for electrical and natural gas
energy equal $591,000 per year.
Installation of a complete biomass-fueled cogeneration system, consisting
of a combustion system, steam boiler, and steam turbine generator, will
produce steam for the kiln operation and electricity to run the mill,
all from the waste wood currently being landfilled. The energy generation
system will be operated 24 hours per day, 5 days per week, consuming biomass
fuel at the rate of 2.08 tons per hour. Assuming the heating value of
the wood waste is 8500 BTU/# and the energy conversion process is 80 percent
efficient, there will be 28,288,000 BTU of steam available of producing
electricity and for operating the kiln.
Deducting 5 million BTU/hr for the kiln operation, a single-stage turbine
with an air cooled condenser would produce about 700 kW, or about 4,200,000
kWhr/year. This is in excess of the mills needs. If the excess is
sold back to the local utility at $.04/kWhr, an additional revenue stream
of $56,000 per year would be generated. We will assume this is equal to
the systems operating costs.
The capital costs for such a facility are approximately $1.6 million.
This will provide the mill owner with a return on investment of 2.7 years.
Technology partners
BEC brings together firms that are leaders in their respective fields.
Advanced Recycling Equipment, Inc. is a supplier of high quality Challenger®
grinders and other material handling equipment. They also are the North
American representative for Talbotts Heating Ltd., a manufacturer
of biomass combustion systems that use an extended combustion zone to
virtually eliminate VOC emissions and leave very little particulate, with
very low NOx content. Talbotts has been in business for more than
30 years and has over 3,000 units installed word-wide.
SEECO (Southern Engineering & Equipment Co.) has been producing and
installing custom steam turbine generator systems for 30 years, with systems
in operation across the country and overseas.
Pulling all the pieces together with automation and controls systems is
Revere Control Systems, Inc., an expert in industrial controls and automation
with more than 20 years of experience serving a wide variety of industries.
For more information, please contact :
Dave Gamble, President of Biomass Energy Concepts LLC
Phone : (205)824-1205, ext. 3111
E-mail : dgamble@reverecontrol.com
Website : www.co-generation.com
Système dhumidification
sans air Humijet
Seul manufacturier au Québec dune technologie innovatrice
qui révolutionne lhumidification industrielle
Le système dhumidification sans air Humijet permet de maintenir
ou dajouter un taux dhumidité relative dans lair
ambiant sans lapport dair comprimé ou de vapeur. Cest
un système de conception et de qualité industrielle, simple,
compact, peu coûteux et facile dinstallation.
Il est sain à lutilisation (car il ne nécessite pas
de traitement chimique de leau et ne contient pas des réserves
deau morte ou stagnante propice à propagation des bactéries
dans lair). Cest un système très économique
et efficace à lutilisation compte tenu quil nécessite
quune pompe à injection pour la vaporisation de leau.
Il est aussi simple dentretien, étant donné quil
est constitué de peu de pièces.
Le système dhumidification sans air Humijet est une alternative
économique et flexible pour tous les besoins en humidification
dans les industries et les institutions lorsque comparé à
un système dhumidification traditionnel.
Quelques avantages du système dhumidification Humijet
Il permet de réduire les coûts de chauffage tout en
obtenant un confort accru
En été, les besoins en climatisation sont moindres
car il réduit la température de lair ambiant
Il améliore la qualité de lair et de lenvironnement
Il réduit les polluants en suspension dans lair
Faible consommation énergétique, il ne nécessite
pas lutilisation dair comprimé ou de vapeur
Faible coût dinstallation, dopération
et dentretien
Réduit lélectricité statique et les
risques dexplosion et dincendie
Il est fiable, sûr et très silencieux à lutilisation
Ses capacités sont sans limites; il est facilement expansible
Il ny a pas de temps dattente lors de son démarrage,
la vaporisation est instantanée.
Technologie
Le système dhumidification Humijet est constitué de
peu de pièces; principalement dune pompe dinjection
deau haute pression. Cette pompe est alimentée par un système
de filtration deau pouvant être raccordé dans certains
cas à un système de filtration deau à osmose
offert en option. Un réseau compact de tuyauterie en acier inoxydable
vient ensuite relier la pompe dinjection aux buses datomisation
également en acier inoxydable.
Le principe de fonctionnement est basé sur une pompe à injection
deau relié à leau de laqueduc et alimentant
un réseau de buses datomisation. Lorsque le niveau minimum
dhumidité est atteint dans la pièce, un hygromètre
assisté dun contrôleur, commande à la pompe
dinjection deau de fournir un débit et une pression
pré-programmé aux buses de vaporisation. Un système
de monitoring assure un niveau de sécurité sans faille en
cas de bris de tuyaux, de manque deau ou de surchauffe de la pompe
dinjection.
Quelques exemples dapplication
Bois ouvré, meuble, portes et fenêtres, usine de transformation
et de finition du bois :
Conserve automatiquement un niveau précis dhumidité
dans lair ambiant
Élimine les rejets dus au craquement,
fendillement, et contraintes de torsion dans les matériaux
Maintient une stabilité dimensionnelle des matériaux
Augmente la performance des opérations de collage
Réduit les particules de poussière en suspension
dans lair ambiant
Diminue les rejets, augmente le niveau
dadhésion, diminue le temps de séchage et stabilise
le fini de surface pour les opérations de peinture et de finition.
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